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Data Breach Notification Laws and
the Quantum Decryption Problem
Phillip Harmon*
Abstract
In the United States, state data breach notification laws
protect citizens by forcing businesses to notify those citizens when
their personal information has been compromised. These laws
almost universally include an exception for encrypted personal
data. Modern encryption methods make encrypted data largely
useless, and the notification laws aim to encourage good
encryption practices.
This Note challenges the wisdom of laws that place blind
faith in the continued infallibility of encryption. For decades,
Shor’s algorithm has promised polynomial-time factoring once a
sufficiently powerful quantum computer can be built. Competing
laboratories around the world steadily continue to march toward
this end. Once quantum computers become strong enough,
classical encryption will no longer remain secure.
Ramifications of quantum decryption would reverberate
through all aspects of security and society. This Note focuses only
on the interplay of this development with data breach
notification laws. While these laws cannot prevent technological
progress, a federal data breach notification law could encourage
adoption of a quantum-secure classical encryption method. This
* J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A.
Washington and Lee University. The author is grateful to Alexandra Clark,
T.J. Benedict, and Mitch McCloy for their comments on early drafts. Special
thanks to Joshua Fairfield, for his guidance and mentorship, and to Cooper
Baird, for his insights on the nuances of quantum algorithms and all things
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without support and feedback from Ellie Bradach and MacKenzye Leroy.
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would dampen the harm quantum decryption causes by limiting
the relevance of newly useful encrypted data.
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INTRODUCTION
Oh, the horrors of calculus! At some point, nearly everyone
has struggled to get through a tough math class. Many people
are not wired for numbers, and even a gold-star mathematician
will eventually come to a problem that she cannot immediately
comprehend. The frustration inherent in grappling with a hard
math problem is nearly universal. But challenging problems are
not all bad. Some calculations are so difficult that even
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computers cannot readily solve them.1 Practical uses of those
problems can result. Indeed, complex math problems form the
backbone of encryption, a huge facilitator for modern human
interaction.2
What happens when a technological breakthrough makes a
near impossible problem suddenly straightforward to solve?
Rapidly approaching innovations in quantum technology
promise a quick solution to the classically difficult math
problems underlying encryption.3 Unfortunately, our society is
built around, and our laws implicitly assume, the continued
infallibility of those hard problems.
This Note focuses on data breach notification laws, which
require data holders to tell people if someone has stolen data
containing their private personal information. To start, Part I
will introduce encryption and explain how difficult math
problems have been manipulated to secretly convey information.
Part II will closely examine existing data breach notification
laws. Particular attention will be given to the ways in which
various jurisdictions address encryption. Most do not require
any alert in instances in which encrypted data was taken,
because the encrypted data is assumed to be unusable.4 Part III
of this Note will examine the development of quantum
technologies and how Shor’s algorithm will render current
encryption methods insecure. Existing data breach notification
laws will be revisited in Part IV to see if they could continue to
properly function as that development approaches. Finally, Part
V will propose a new data breach notification framework that

1. See David Grossman, After 65 Years, Supercomputers Finally Solve
this Unsolvable Math Problem, POPULAR MECHS. (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://perma.cc/XL3U-K9V3 (detailing how supercomputers needed over a
million hours of computing power to solve the Diophantine equation for the
integer forty-two).
2. See Encryption 101: What It Is, How It Works, and Why We Need It,
TREND MICRO (July 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/TPP9-CKR9 (noting that the
mathematical algorithms underlying encryption provide security in “activities
we can no longer live without”).
3. See infra Part III.
4. See Mark Burdon et al., Encryption Safe Harbours and Data Breach
Notification Laws, 26 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 520, 528 (2010) (asserting that,
in United States data breach notification laws, “encryption equates to
security”).
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would better protect personal data as the quantum-decrypting
horizon approaches.
I.

IDENTITY THEFT AND ENCRYPTION

Over the past few decades, the internet has enormously
impacted how society functions.5 Most people can quickly list
numerous ways that they use it on a daily basis: online shopping
is commonplace;6 banks allow us to manage our money
remotely;7 and social media platforms let us connect and
interact with friends around the world.8 With increased reliance
on the internet for these services, private information has
become widely digitalized.9 Every online interaction conveys
some information—be it a name, an address, or a credit-card
number—that might be saved or otherwise used to create a
record.10 If compiled, this information could harm individuals by

5. See Marianna Diomidous et al., Social and Psychological Effects of the
Internet Use, 24 ACTA INFORMATICA MEDICA 66, 66 (2016) (crediting computers
and the internet with bringing about a “revolution in human daily life”).
6. See Claire Hansen, Consumers Continue a March Toward Online
Shopping, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 16, 2020, 5:05 PM),
https://perma.cc/E8XW-NSSP (reporting that online retail sales constituted
16.1 percent of total sales during the second quarter of 2020 and that
three-quarters of shoppers intend to do some online shopping for the holidays);
Matt Rosoff, Amazon Will Be the Most Important Company of the 2020s, CNBC
(Dec. 13, 2019, 8:59 AM), https://perma.cc/5X7B-KXUC (detailing how
Amazon, the largest online retailer in the United States, increased its
e-commerce revenues by sevenfold in the 2010s).
7. See Manage My Bank Account, USAA, https://perma.cc/5RLU-BCBV
(providing options for wire transfers, depositing checks by taking pictures of
them, and transferring money between bank accounts, all online); Sign-In,
BANK OF AM., https://perma.cc/JH52-82AG (offering online management of
finances and bank accounts).
8. See About Meta, META, https://perma.cc/C5WH-ALF6 (“At Meta, we
are constantly . . . working together to connect people all over the world.”);
About Instagram, INSTAGRAM, https://perma.cc/8GS5-SR77 (“We bring you
closer to the people and things you love.”).
9. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (1998) (“[W]e increasingly speak, listen, and act
through cyberspace. And such activity generates records, dutifully recorded,
sorted, saved, and exchanged by computers.”).
10. Id.
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painting a full picture of their lives with sufficient information
to imitate them in a digital context.11
The proliferation of digital commerce has resulted in
widespread fraud, theft of private information, and identity
theft.12 A few examples of large data breaches illustrate the
magnitude of this problem. In 2018, hackers compromised the
personal information of 147 million consumers held in a
database owned by Equifax, a credit reporting company.13 In
2014, the discovery of a computer programming error known as
the “Heartbleed Bug” incited widespread fear because the bug
rendered passwords and private information from an estimated
half-million websites insecure.14 In a 2013 breach of Adobe,
hackers stole credit-card numbers from roughly three million
customers along with the login information of thirty-eight
million users.15 Incidents like these have occurred repeatedly
throughout the past couple of decades.16 This begs the question:
what prevents nefarious actors from stealing information and
money every time someone engages in a personal transaction
online?
The answer is encryption. Cryptography is the process of
scrambling messages so that only desired parties can
unscramble and discern their meanings by using secret keys.17
11. See id. at 1199 (discussing how data generated from cyber activity can
strip a person of his privacy when compiled into a detailed profile).
12. See S. REP. NO. 111-290, at 3–4 (2010) (expressing concern and
detailing the dangers of fraud and identity theft associated with data
breaches); We Are Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, PRIV. RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://perma.cc/P2TQ-A76J (reporting over 11.7 billion breached records
since 2005).
13. Tara Siegel Bernard, Equifax Breach Affected 147 Million, But Most
Sit Out Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/GES7-GWXQ.
14. See Jane Wakefield, Heartbleed Bug: What You Need to Know, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/4AN2-VGJ5 (reporting on the
Heartbleed bug and its dangers); The Heartbleed Bug, HEARTBLEED,
https://perma.cc/TDG5-572S (providing detailed information about the bug
and how it could be fixed for domain owners amid the Heartbleed crisis).
15. See Brian Krebs, Adobe Breach Impacted at Least 38 Million Users,
KREBS ON SEC. (Oct. 29, 2013), https://perma.cc/RF82-HLAE.
16. See Michael Hill & Dan Swinhoe, The 15 Biggest Data Breaches of the
21st Century, CSO (July 16, 2021, 2:00 AM), https://perma.cc/ZS5M-WLYA
(recounting results and damages of multiple enormous data breaches).
17. See LYNN MARGARET BATTEN, PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 2 (2013)
(defining cryptography).
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There are two categories of encryption schemes—symmetric
encryption and asymmetric encryption (also known as
private-key
encryption
and
public-key
encryption,
respectively).18 Symmetric encryption relies on two parties
using one key, which only they know, to scramble their
messages.19 Visualize this form of encryption as two friends
mailing each other secret messages by mail inside of a locked
box, where each of the two friends owns one of the only two keys
to the box.20 Unfortunately, private-key encryption is only
secure to the extent that the key is kept and distributed
secretly.21 It would seem that the best way to safely establish
the private key is to pick one together in person, an impossibility
when private communication with a new person is urgent or
there are large geographical divides.22
Public-key encryption solves the key-distribution
problem.23 Under a public-key protocol, there are two keys. The
first key, accessible to the world, can be used to encrypt
information but cannot decrypt a message once it has been
scrambled.24 The second key can decrypt the data but is closely
held by its owner to ensure security.25 Here, imagine someone

18. See Dustin Taylor Vandenberg, Note, Encryption Served Three Ways:
Disruptiveness as the Key to Exceptional Access, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 531,
532–34 (2017) (drawing distinctions between these two encryption methods).
19. See Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416, 426 (2012) (explaining how private-key
encryption works).
20. See Zainul Franciscus, What Is Encryption, and How Does It Work?,
HOW-TO GEEK, https://perma.cc/XPN2-VW4V (archived Dec. 12, 2020)
(providing the above metaphor as an illustration of symmetric encryption
between Alice and Bob, the two traditional named parties in cryptography).
21. See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 19, at 426 (“The critical element in
this approach is to generate and share the key securely.”).
22. See BATTEN, supra note 17, at 3 (highlighting the impracticability of
symmetric encryption and how it historically created trouble during war).
23. See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 19, at 428 (“[T]he public key approach
directly addresses the most glaring weakness of the private-key approach. It
allows people to send messages to each other without first having to securely
share a secret key.”).
24. See id. at 427 (explaining the functions of keys in a public-key
encryption method).
25. Id.
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sending their friend a padlock in the mail.26 The recipient then
writes a message, locks it in a box with the padlock, and returns
the box to the padlock sender.27 If the padlock only has one key
and the box comes back locked, the original party will know that
no one has read the letter in the box.28 Typically in online
interactions, asymmetric encryption is only used to establish a
shared private key because symmetric encryption has an
advantage in computational efficiency, and hence speed.29
Together, public-key and private-key encryption allow for the
security and secrecy necessary to make electronic commerce
possible.30
Without exploring the intricacies of the underlying
mathematics,31 it is important to note that asymmetric key
encryption hinges on two mathematical challenges: factoring
and the discrete logarithm problem.32 Consider this: if asked to
factor the number 21,534,283, most people would throw their
hands up in defeat after trying and failing to divide the number
by small, readily-recognized primes such as two, three, five, and
seven. However, most could multiply the prime numbers 881
and 24,443 relatively easily (with the help of a calculator) and
would find an answer of 21,534,283. As the size of inputs
increases, the computational difficulty of factoring is believed to
26. See Franciscus, supra note 20 (suggesting this metaphor for an
asymmetric key encryption protocol between Alice and Bob).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See BATTEN, supra note 17, at 6 (“All known public key schemes are
far more computationally intensive than symmetric key schemes. . . . For this
reason, public key schemes are traditionally used only for small messages such
as secret keys, whereas symmetric key schemes are retained for sending large
messages.”).
30. See Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 718–25 (1995)
(providing multiple examples of ways in which encryption is critical to the
success of electronic commerce, including the use of digital signatures).
31. See generally R.L. Rivest et al., A Method for Obtaining Digital
Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems, 26 COMMC’NS ACM 96 (1978)
(detailing the mathematical basis for a public-key encryption system with
rigor).
32. See ELEANOR RIEFFEL & WOLFGANG POLAK, QUANTUM COMPUTING: A
GENTLE INTRODUCTION 172 (William Gropp & Ewing Lusk eds., 2011) (“In fact,
all standard public key encryption systems and digital signature schemes are
based on either factoring or the discrete logarithm problem.”).
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be greater than that of multiplication.33 In fact, when numbers
grow very large there is no known way to reliably factor quickly
with a computer.34 That is not to say that decrypting material
encrypted with public-key encryption is impossible without
access to the private key.35 Rather, the massive number of
possible keys renders it highly improbable that educated or even
lucky guessing would thwart security of the information in any
meaningful amount of time.36
The discrete logarithm problem is much more difficult to
illustrate, but functions similarly to factoring in that it becomes
increasingly difficult with large inputs.37 Security of online
transactions depends on the well-founded notion that
mathematicians might never discover an efficient method for
computers to solve these problems.38
Still, a reasonable person might retain some hesitancy
about the safety of communicating information over the
internet. Why should we assume that companies are doing their
due diligence by encrypting all communications? How would we

33. See William L. Hosch, P Versus NP Problem, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Aug.
11, 2009), https://perma.cc/WU8Y-APZ9 (last updated Jan. 9, 2020)
(identifying multiplication as an example of a relatively easy problem but
noting that factoring is an extremely difficult problem). A problem of
polynomial time (“P”) difficulty can be solved by an algorithm with steps
bounded by a polynomial. Id. While multiplication is a P problem, no such
algorithms are known for factoring or solving the discrete logarithm problem
with a computer. Id. It follows that there is currently no guaranteed method
of decrypting messages that were scrambled using public-key encryption with
a computer in any reasonable amount of time. Id.
34. See Computer Scientists Set New Record for Cryptographic Challenge,
U.C. SAN DIEGO (Apr. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/44JS-PJTB (reporting that a
team of six researchers spanning multiple continents finally solved a
challenge, issued to the world in 1991, to factor a specified 250-digit number).
35. See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 19, at 429 (emphasizing that all forms
of encryption are subject to attack and not completely invulnerable).
36. See id. at 430 (pointing out that longer keys mathematically increase
resistance to brute force attacks); Andrew Braun, How Secure Is Your Stolen
Encrypted Data?, MAKETECHEASIER (Mar. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/SAT5ZY6S (estimating that using brute computational force to attack AES-256
encryption would currently take up to three sexdecillion years, a very long
time).
37. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
38. See Hosch, supra note 33 (“The discovery of an efficient algorithm for
factoring large numbers would break most modern encryption schemes.”).
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even know if our information was stolen in an unencrypted
form?
II.

DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS AND ENCRYPTION
EXCEPTIONS

State legislatures have taken steps to address these
concerns. In 2002, California enacted a statute requiring any
owner of licensed computerized data to notify state residents
whose “personal information was, or is reasonably believed to
have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.”39 Other
jurisdictions quickly followed suit, and now all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands each have some form of “data breach notification” law.40
While the specifics of these laws vary, they all tend to focus on
defining what types of personal-information data merit
heightened protection and the conditions under which data
holders must tell individuals about possible theft or breach of
that sensitive information.41 Data breach notification laws have
the dual purpose of protecting private citizens and holding data
owners accountable.42 If a person knows that a malicious party
might have stolen her private information, she can take
protective steps such as freezing her credit or monitoring
account balances with heightened scrutiny.43 The notification
39. Assemb. B. 700, 2001–2002 Sess. (Cal. 2002).
40. See Data Breach Notification in the United States and Territories,
PRIV. RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 10, 2018) https://perma.cc/B7EG-5JYT
(providing basic information about every data breach notification law in the
United States).
41. See Sara A. Needles, Comment, The Data Game: Learning to Love the
State-Based Approach to Data Breach Notification Law, 88 N.C. L. REV. 267,
273–80 (2009) (explaining that data breach notification laws generally define
what constitutes personally identifiable data, what events constitute data
breaches, and how or whether a data holder must notify people if their
personally identifiable data has been compromised).
42. See David Thaw, Data Breach (Regulatory) Effects, 2015 CARDOZO L.
REV. DE-NOVO 151, 158 (2015) (“The stated purpose of most jurisdictions’
breach notification statutes is to enable consumers to take steps to protect
themselves by requiring custodians of this information to inform consumers
when those custodians have lost control of this information.”).
43. See Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FTC (Sept.
8, 2017), https://perma.cc/6BGE-ZWA8 (last updated Oct. 5, 2017) (suggesting
different ways people might protect themselves from identity theft or fraud
following the Equifax breach).

484

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475 (2022)

also informs individuals that they might be entitled to
compensation from the negligent party that lost their data.44
Requiring data custodians to report breaches encourages them
to take greater precautionary measures because public
knowledge of a breach will financially damage the custodian.45
The reporting mechanism differs by jurisdiction. Some
jurisdictions require data holders to report potential breaches
directly to the affected parties.46 Others require an additional
report to a state actor with authority to later publish
information about the breach at the state actor’s discretion.47
One common provision requires the data holder to check with
law enforcement and potentially delay issuing notices to ensure
that the notices do not interfere with any ongoing criminal
investigation.48 Surprisingly, there is no federal data breach
notification statute despite the piecemeal protections enacted in
each of the states.49 While data breach notification requirements

44. See Siegel Bernard, supra note 13 (discussing a settlement following
the Equifax breach that allowed parties to reclaim money lost because of the
data breach); Scottie Andrew, Yahoo Could Pay You $358 for its Massive Data
Breach Settlement. Here’s How to Claim It, CNN, https://perma.cc/RM2SRJRM (last updated Oct. 15, 2019, 10:08 AM) (urging eligible consumers who
received notification of a data breach at Yahoo to file for their share of a class
action settlement).
45. See IBM Study Shows Data Breach Costs on the Rise; Financial
Impact Felt for Years, MKTS. INSIDER (July 23, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/HXX5-SRDZ (reporting on an IBM study, which found that on
average a data breach will cost a company $3.92 million).
46. See, e.g., 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 48.30 (2022) (requiring disclosure of a
data breach directly to affected residents unless a law enforcement agency
requests delay).
47. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/10 (2022) (“Upon receiving
notification from a data collector of a breach of personal information, the
Attorney General may publish the name of the data collector that suffered the
breach, the types of personal information compromised in the breach, and the
date range of the breach.”).
48. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2022) (“The notice required by
this section may be delayed if a law enforcement agency informs the person
that notification may impede a criminal investigation or jeopardize national
or homeland security . . . .”)
49. A bill introduced in the Senate at the end of 2017 that would have
created a federal data breach notification law for personally identifiable
information never reached a vote. Data Security and Breach Notification Act,
S. 2179, 115th Cong. (2017).
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reach across jurisdictional boundaries,50 standardized
requirements at the federal level would encourage greater
uniformity.
As previously acknowledged, theft of encrypted data
presents very little danger if the malicious party lacks a
decryption key.51 In fact, legislators would likely want to exclude
encrypted information from data breach notification laws out of
fear that unnecessary warnings would dilute the efficacy of
urgent ones in a boy-who-cried-wolf effect.52 Sure enough,
practically all jurisdictions with data breach notification laws
include an encryption haven, or encryption exception.53 This
means data custodians do not need to tell citizens that their
encrypted data has been stolen.54 When the California
legislature drafted the first data breach notification law, it
intended for the statute to act as an incentive for companies to
practice better data hygiene by encrypting their data to avoid
potentially embarrassing notifications of breach.55 This Note
will consider different ways in which the various jurisdictions
enacted encryption havens and compare their effectiveness.

50. Typically, notification is required if any resident of a jurisdiction is
affected by a breach, so the location of the data holder is irrelevant. See, e.g.,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12C-6 (2022) (requiring that a data owner “provide
notification to each New Mexico resident whose personal identifying
information is reasonably believed to have been subject to a security breach”).
51. Supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
52. In The Boy Who Cried Wolf, a child repeatedly lied to his village about
the approach of a dangerous wolf. Consequently, the village did not believe
him when he authentically tried to warn it about a real wolf. The Boy Who
Cried Wolf, FABLES OF AESOP, https://perma.cc/4WNS-X4SJ (last updated Oct.
5, 2020). This classic fable illustrates why the absence of an encryption haven
could create harmful apathy toward notifications that carry real significance.
53. See Jill Joerling, Note, Data Breach Notification Laws: An Argument
for a Comprehensive Federal Law to Protect Consumer Data, 32 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 467, 475 (2010) (explaining that states have encrypted data safe
harbors in their data breach notification laws, which means that no
notification is required if compromised data was encrypted).
54. Id.
55. See Personal Information: Privacy: Hearing on SB 1386 Before the
Assembly Committee on Business and Professions, 2001–2002 Sess. 3 (Cal.
2002) (“In practice, this bill will create incentives for organizations seeking to
simplify their legal requirements to encrypt their personal information data.”).
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A.

West Virginia

In West Virginia, data breaches are explicitly defined so
that they do not include any instance in which encrypted
information has been taken.56 Other jurisdictions indirectly
exclude compromised encrypted data from their definition of a
data breach in a similar way by excluding information found in
an encrypted form from the definition of personal information
(the loss of which constitutes a breach).57 In total, twenty-eight
different jurisdictions have data breach notification laws that
exclude all encrypted data from the definition of a breach.58 This
Note refers to the exclusion of all encrypted information from
the definition of data breach as the “West Virginia model” for
ease of identification.
B.

South Dakota

Although the West Virginia model provides incentives for
data owners to ensure that all data remains encrypted, statutes
56. See W. VA. CODE § 46A-2A-101(1) (2022) (defining a security breach
as “the unauthorized access and acquisition of unencrypted and unredacted
computerized data that compromises the security or confidentiality of personal
information”).
57. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.12(A)(2)(a) (West 2022) (recognizing
a data breach in instances in which personal information has been taken);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.12(A)(6)(a) (West 2022) (requiring certain data
elements to be unencrypted for information to constitute “personal
information”).
58. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-551 (2022) (Arizona); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-110-103 (2022) (Arkansas); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b (2022)
(Connecticut); D.C. CODE § 28-3851 (2022) (District of Columbia); FLA. STAT.
§ 501.171 (2022) (Florida); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911 (2022) (Georgia); 9 GUAM
CODE ANN. § 48.20 (2022) (Guam); IDAHO CODE § 28-51-104 (2022) (Idaho);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01 (2022) (Kansas); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.732
(West 2022) (Kentucky); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3073 (2022) (Louisiana); ME.
STAT. tit. 10 § 1347 (2022) (Maine); MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 14-3501 (West
2022) (Maryland); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 75-24-29 (2022) (Mississippi); MO. REV.
STAT. § 407.1500 (2022) (Missouri); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2022)
(Montana); NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.040 (2022) (Nevada); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-161 (West 2022) (New Jersey); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01 (2022)
(North Dakota); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.12 (West 2022) (Ohio); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 24, § 162 (2022) (Oklahoma); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 4052 (2022)
(Puerto Rico); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (2022) (South Carolina); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-44-102 (West 2022) (Utah); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2430 (2022)
(Vermont); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2208 (2022) (Virgin Islands); W. VA. CODE
§ 46A-2A-101 (2022) (West Virginia); WIS. STAT. § 134.98 (2022) (Wisconsin).
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of this kind do not mention encryption keys in determining what
constitutes a breach,59 despite the fact that anyone with the
proper key can easily read encrypted data.60 To eliminate any
possible loophole concerning discovery of confidential keys, the
South Dakota legislature defined data breaches to include stolen
encrypted data if the corresponding key was also acquired.61
Twenty-two jurisdictions have adopted data breach notification
laws that define data breaches to include the theft of encrypted
data only when the confidential key was also stolen or otherwise
available to the stealing party.62 This Note will refer to
encryption havens of this kind as the “South Dakota model.”
While the South Dakota model appears to give stronger
protection to some data breach victims than the West Virginia
model, explicitly identifying encryption keys as a mode of breach
is likely only a semantic difference. Although this exact issue
has never been litigated, a deciding court could reasonably find
the leak of encrypted data with a key to constitute a breach of

59. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.12(A)(4) (West 2022)
(acknowledging that access to a confidential key facilitates decryption but
failing to incorporate the existence of such keys into the definition of what
constitutes a breach).
60. See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 19, at 426 (likening cryptographic
keys to physical keys capable of quickly opening their corresponding locks).
61. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-40-19(1) (2022) (defining “breach of
security system” as “the unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted
computerized data or encrypted computerized data and the encryption key by
any person that materially compromises the security, confidentiality, or
integrity of personal or protected information maintained by the information
holder”).
62. See ALA. CODE § 8-38-2(b)(2) (2022) (Alabama); ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.48.090 (2022) (Alaska); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716(2)(a.4) (2022)
(Colorado); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-101 (2022) (Delaware); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 487N-1 (2022) (Hawaii); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5 (2022) (Illinois);
IND. CODE § 24-4.9-2-2 (2022) (Indiana); IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2022) (Iowa);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H § 1 (2022) (Massachusetts); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61(e)
(2022) (Minnesota); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-802 (2022) (Nebraska); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 359-C:19 (2022) (New Hampshire); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-12C-2(D) (2022) (New Mexico); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney
2022) (New York); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-61(14) (2022) (North Carolina); OR.
REV. STAT. § 646A.602 (2022) (Oregon); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2022)
(Pennsylvania); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.3-3 (2022) (Rhode Island); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-40-19 (2022) (South Dakota); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-18-2107 (2022) (Tennessee); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053 (West
2022) (Texas); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (2022) (Virginia).
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unencrypted information under the West Virginia model.63 After
all, any person possessing the proper key can read encrypted
data as though they were written in plain text.64 Holding
otherwise would run contrary to the explicit purpose of these
laws: to notify people when any unauthorized party has accessed
or taken their personal information.65 It follows that a court
would likely rule in favor of notification in borderline cases.
While more jurisdictions currently ascribe to the West Virginia
model, some legislatures have started flipping to the South
Dakota model, finding no drawbacks to the explicit
clarification.66
Query then how a temporal element would affect this
analysis. Suppose a company found that a hacker tried to steal
personal data, but the company was confident that only
encrypted personal information was taken. Would the company
have any obligation to notify those parties whose encrypted
information was taken if the corresponding key was stolen a few
years later?
Presumably, the answer would still be yes under both the
West Virginia and South Dakota models. As a standalone
incident, a malicious party taking encrypted data does not
constitute a data breach in any of the jurisdictions with
encryption havens in their data breach notification laws.67 Even
under the South Dakota framework, the initial theft of the
encrypted data would not have constituted a breach because
“encrypted computerized data and the encryption key” were not
63. See, e.g., In re Equifax Inc. Sec. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1208
(N.D. Ga. 2019) (listing Equifax’s practice of putting encryption keys on a
public server as an egregious security error and equating it to instances in
which the data Equifax owned was left unencrypted entirely).
64. See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 19, at 426.
65. See Mark Burdon, Contextualizing the Tensions and Weaknesses of
Information Privacy and Data Breach Notification Laws, 27 SANTA CLARA
COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 78 (2010) (“First, the law primarily seeks to
formally recognize that an individual has a ‘right to know’ about unauthorized
misuse of his or her personal information and notice of the incident enables
mitigation of subsequent identity theft.”).
66. For example, Illinois narrowed its encryption haven to exclude
instances in which encrypted information was compromised along with the
associated key in 2016. H.B. 1260, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016)
(enacted).
67. See, e.g., MISS. CODE. ANN. § 75-24-29(2) (2022) (excluding encrypted
information from the definition of a data breach).
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taken together.68 In spite of this statutory language, the theft of
a key alone would probably force the data holder to notify all
people whose personal information had been encrypted by the
compromised code of the potential breach. Encryption remains
effective only to the extent that the keys remain private.69 Any
hacker with the skills to discern a confidential key would only
have done so with intent to decrypt related information.70 The
data custodian must assume that all encrypted information has
been breached in addition to the key, because any of the data
could have been compromised. Alternatively, someone with
inside knowledge of the key, like a disgruntled employee, could
compromise key integrity by going rogue, but such a party would
also already have had known access to the encrypted data in the
first place.71 Either way, loss of the key would constitute a
breach, independently requiring notification to the parties
whose encrypted information had been previously taken.
C.

California

A third type of encryption exception more explicitly
addresses this scenario. California’s data breach notification
law does not define what constitutes a security breach in
relation to whether data was encrypted, but rather makes
notification conditional based on the encryption status of the
stolen data.72 In the above example, under California law, there
would have been a breach the moment that the information
holder learned that encrypted data was stolen, but the statute
68. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-40-19(1) (2022).
69. See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 19, at 426.
70. See Braun, supra note 36 (“Attackers are well aware that encrypted
data is useless without keys, so what do they go after? The keys.”).
71. See Rogue Postbank Employees Steal Master Encryption Key; Make
Off with $3.2 Million, FINEXTRA (June 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/C945-VG7L
(reporting on the devastating effects of an inside data breach); Sooraj Shah,
The Rise of Employees Stealing Data: How Do Businesses Stop This from
Happening?, INFORMATIONAGE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/EVJ9-8RGR
(detailing the increasing potential for data breaches by companies’ employees).
72. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2022) (requiring notification
when “unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to
have been, acquired by an unauthorized person,” or a key and encrypted
information have been taken, giving the trustee “a reasonable belief that the
encryption key or security credential could render that personal information
readable or usable”).
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does not call for the holder to report the breach until someone
compromised the key.73 Although interpretation of the West
Virginia and South Dakota encryption exceptions would likely
result in the same outcome, this formulation better handles
temporal breach issues by broadening the definition of a breach
and narrowing the conditions for notification. Presumably, that
difference would simplify any potential litigation and increase
the likelihood of a finding in favor of notification. Michigan and
Washington join California as the only states to have adopted
what this Note will refer to as the “California model” for
legislating encryption havens.74
D.

Tennessee

Two additional treatments of encryption in data breach
notification laws merit some attention. First, a jurisdiction could
decide that any breach of personal information requires notice.
While no data breach notification laws in the United States
currently ignore encryption practices this way,75 Tennessee
adopted this rigid approach for roughly eight months in 2016
and 2017.76 Starting from a West Virginia model, the state
legislature removed the encryption exception from its definition
of a data breach.77 Senator Bill Ketron, the leading proponent of
the change, appeared largely motivated by a desire to provide
greater security and information to constituents, and perhaps in
part by a misunderstanding of the relative security that

73.
74.

Id.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2022) (California); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 445.72 (2022) (Michigan); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 (2022)
(Washington).
75. See Data Breach Notification in the United States and Territories,
PRIV. RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 10, 2018) https://perma.cc/B7EG-5JYT
(documenting the treatment of encryption in every data breach notification
law in the United States).
76. See Thomas Ritter, Tennessee Amends Its Breach Notification Law
(AGAIN) and Reinserts the Encryption Safe Harbor, THOMPSON BURTON (Mar.
29, 2017), https://perma.cc/3EAK-Y3A3 (reporting that Tennessee abandoned
its encryption haven for about eight months).
77. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (2015), with TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-18-2107 (2016) (changing the definition of a security breach from
“unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted computerized data” in 2015 to
“unauthorized acquisition of computerized data” in 2016).
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encryption provides.78 Regardless, after heavy lobbying from
data holders the state quickly reversed course to include an
encryption exception, this time in alignment with the South
Dakota model.79 Within a short window, the legislature realized
that ubiquitous and often unnecessary notifications would
impose unreasonable costs on information holders.80
Additionally, the state wanted to promote responsible
encryption practices, an original purpose of data breach
notification laws.81 Although Tennessee’s legislature had noble
intentions in its attempt to protect consumers, an encryption
exception proved more practical.
Still, excluding an encryption exception provides some
benefit because not all encryption is created equally. For
example, in a groundbreaking 2013 article, the New York Times
reported that the National Security Agency (NSA) had
circumvented common encryption practices and was invading
citizen privacy.82 A follow-up report revealed that the NSA
accomplished this by building a backdoor into a standard
78. See Hearing on S.B. 2005 Before the S. Com. & Lab. Comm., 109th
Gen. Assemb. at 1:09:12 (Tenn. 2016) (statement of Sen. Bill Ketron),
https://perma.cc/JB4X-TQXJ (“This bill will also include encrypted. And the
reason for including the encrypted is that encrypted data is now being stolen
almost as easily as the unencrypted. So, we felt like that [sic] we should include
that.”).
79. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (2016), with TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-18-2107 (2017) (amending the statute to clarify that a breach of
system security includes only the acquisition of unencrypted data or encrypted
data with a key as opposed to the previous provision, which considered loss of
all personal information a data breach).
80. See Hearing on S.B. 547 Before the S. Com. & Lab. Comm., 110th Gen.
Assemb. at 1:06:45 (Tenn. 2017) (statement of Sen. Bill Ketron),
https://perma.cc/ZPF5-RHNH (“The language will eliminate the burden of
reporting encrypted data that does not threaten the integrity of personal
information maintained by the information holder, conserving both time and
expenses.”).
81. See Hearing on H.B. 545 Before the H. Consumer & Hum. Res.
Subcomm. at 1:51 (Tenn. 2017) (statement of Rep. Courtney Rogers),
https://perma.cc/DS75-9Z2Q (“All encrypted data is not created equal, and by
just having it all up together we kind of created a disincentive for companies
to encrypt their data. And so, we’re going to rectify that with further
clarifying.”).
82. See Nicole Perlroth et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of
Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), https://perma.cc/5MV7-E7VP
(detailing efforts by the NSA to skirt around encryption through the Bullrun
program).
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algorithm used to generate the random large prime numbers
necessary for encryption.83 That standard algorithm was
immediately reevaluated and discarded.84 In theory, however, a
data holder could still rely on encryption that applied this
standard, which is known to be breakable. Encryption
exceptions employed by other statutes might allow such a data
holder to avoid reporting requirements. By excluding encryption
havens entirely, Tennessee forcefully, albeit temporarily,
rejected this prospect.
E.

Wyoming

Wyoming provides a better example of how data breach
notification laws can function without an encryption haven.
Wyoming’s data breach notification statute completely excludes
any mention of encryption.85 Instead, the acquisition of select
personal identifying information may be excluded from the
definition of a breach to the extent that some digits of numerical
data have been redacted.86 Rather than requiring notification
following the discovery of a breach, the statute gives each data
owner the discretion to “conduct in good faith a reasonable and
prompt investigation to determine the likelihood that personal
identifying information has been or will be misused.”87 This lack
of treatment with respect to encryption still allows data trustees
not to report the theft of encrypted data when they immediately
and reasonably decide that no malicious party can misuse the
data (as long as the key remains secure).88 It also differs from
the failed Tennessee experiment because Wyoming does not
have the same legislative history explicitly establishing

83. See Nicole Perlroth, Government Announces Steps to Restore
Confidence on Encryption Standards, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013, 7:02 PM),
https://perma.cc/TT86-7QRR (explaining how the NSA pushed the
compromised Dual EC DRBG standard).
84. See id.
85. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-501 (2022).
86. See id. § 40-12-501(a)(vii) (defining personal information as a name
coupled with unredacted information like a credit-card or social-security
number); id. § 40-12-501(a)(viii) (establishing that in this context, redacted
means altered or truncated so that no more than five digits are accessible).
87. Id. § 40-12-502(a).
88. See id.
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legislative intent for companies to send a notification of every
encrypted data breach.89
Of course, self-regulation with respect to the notification
decision could have serious drawbacks. In borderline cases, a
company might seek to avoid the heavy financial burdens
associated with the public knowledge of a data breach by
choosing not to notify the affected parties.90 That said, experts
have provided reasoned arguments both for and against
self-regulation.91 Given the security of normal encrypted data,
the Wyoming statute will almost certainly never lead to more
notification than a data breach notification law using the
California model because reasonable data trustees would never
choose to report the theft of encrypted information unless they
had a concern about the key or encryption mechanism.
Suffice it to say, jurisdictions around the United States
have adopted a multitude of varying data breach notification
laws to combat information theft crimes. These statutes largely
function with the dual purpose of notifying people when
someone has compromised their sensitive personal information
and encouraging data holders to encrypt their data.92 Implicitly,
data breach notification laws rely on the principle that the
mathematical complexities underlying encryption render it
impervious to traditional computing attacks.93 This assumption
is necessary because there is no known, better way to efficiently
facilitate secure online interactions, and researchers have found

89. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
90. See IBM Study Shows Data Breach Costs on the Rise, supra note 45
(demonstrating the tremendous expenses of a data breach).
91. See Alexander Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Big Field, Small
Potatoes: An Empirical Assessment of EPA’s Self-Audit Policy, 23 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 415, 426 (2004) (suggesting that self-policed EPA violation
reports might act as red herrings to distract from major unreported violations);
Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the
Shadow of the Regulator, 24 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 62–63 (2008) (finding that
self-policing becomes much more common with frequent inspection and
greater threat of enforcement action). But see Neil Malhotra et al., Does Private
Regulation Preempt Public Regulation?, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 19, 34–35
(2019) (determining that industries might self-regulate to acknowledge a
problem and act on it in efforts to preempt legal obligations that could be more
expensive, more onerous, and less effective).
92. See supra notes 42–44, 51–55 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
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no evidence that the mathematical premise is false.94 However,
a looming technological advancement soon promises to throw
the current state of private communications and informational
data storage into chaos.
III. QUANTUM COMPUTING
Toward the end of the twentieth century, scientists
combined information theory with quantum physics to
reimagine computation and the physics of its underlying
mechanisms.95 Quantum computing developed as a result.96 At
the most basic level, classical computers rely on binary—a
base-two counting system visualized with strings of ones and
zeros—to create complex commands and perform intricate
operations.97 The smallest unit of binary, a bit, will take on a
value of either zero or one depending on the presence or absence
of an electrical signal.98
Unlike the binary units used by classical computers,
quantum bits (commonly referred to as “qubits”)—the building
blocks of quantum computing—exist as a continuum, or
superposition, of possible values.99 Whereas a bit must take on
a single value of either zero or one, any given qubit
simultaneously holds both values (along with every number in
between).100 When someone measures the value of a qubit on a
binary basis, the state of the qubit changes into one of the binary
options.101 That measurement value is probabilistically
94.
95.

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See ELEANOR RIEFFEL & WOLFGANG POLAK, QUANTUM COMPUTING: A
GENTLE INTRODUCTION 1–2 (William Gropp & Ewing Lusk eds., 2011)
(explaining how information theory allowed for discussion of computation
abstracted from underlying mechanics and scientists then applied these
concepts to a system of computation utilizing quantum measurement).
96. Id.
97. See Anthony Heddings, What Is Binary, and Why Do Computers Use
It?, HOW-TO GEEK (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:40 AM), https://perma.cc/9264-NPRU
(describing binary and how it works).
98. Id.
99. See Kevin Bosner & Jonathan Strickland, How Quantum Computers
Work, HOW STUFF WORKS (Dec. 8, 2000), https://perma.cc/DTP6-LC9V
(providing a brief description of the qubit).
100. Id.
101. See RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 95, at 16–17 (explaining
superpositions and the effects of single-qubit measurement). To illustrate this
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dependent on the fixed initial superposition of the qubit.102
Because measurement changes the state of a qubit, each qubit
has the capability to hold exactly one bit of classical computing
information.103 That said, a quantum property known as
entanglement mysteriously allows multiple qubits to yield the
same random results upon measurement.104 While intricacies of
the underlying theory far exceed the scope of this Note,
mathematicians have taken advantage of entanglement to
produce non-intuitive results and build an understanding of the
operations that a computer built on entangled qubits could carry
out.105
For many problems and tasks, researchers have not yet
found quantum algorithms that are provably more efficient than
the fastest known classical analog.106 However, some quantum
phenomenon, consider the polarization of a beam of light. Id. at 10–13. Photons
will only pass through a polaroid film with probabilities based on their
amplitudes relative to the polarity of the film. Id. If a photon does pass through
the film, it is now polarized in the direction of the film, and its initial polarity
along with information about it has been lost. Id.
102. See id.
103. See RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 95, at 17–18
[T]he properties of quantum measurement severely restrict the
amount of information that can be extracted from a
qubit. . . . [E]ven though a quantum bit can be in infinitely many
different superposition states, it is possible to extract only a single
classical bit’s worth of information from a single quantum bit.
104. See id. at 60–62 (discussing this phenomenal behavior and the
corresponding paradox of why particles separated by such a large distance will
behave in the exact same random way every time, and how scientists have no
explanation for this natural wonder); A. Einstein et al., Can
Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered
Complete?, 47 PHYSICAL REV. 777, 780 (1935) (concluding that our
understanding of quantum physics as it relates to reality is incomplete in this
area).
105. See RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 95, at 2–4 (detailing a brief history
of the development of quantum computing).
106. See, e.g., Peter Høyer et al., Quantum Complexities of Ordered
Searching, Sorting, and Element Distinctness, 34 ALGORITHMICA 429, 447
(2002) (determining that quantum algorithms cannot provide a meaningful
advantage in sorting over classical algorithms). But see Peter W. Shor, Why
Haven’t More Quantum Algorithms Been Found?, 50 J. ACM 87, 88–89 (2003)
(suggesting that mathematicians have not discovered more quantum
algorithms improving on classical computing processes in part because they
have focused on superpolynomial speedups to difficult problems rather than
focusing on discovering polynomial time improvements to already relatively
fast classical algorithms). In fact, the discovery of a seemingly faster quantum
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algorithms have the capacity to more efficiently address
challenges that would take significant amounts of time for even
the strongest classical computers to reliably solve.107 In 1994,
applied mathematician Peter Shor generated wide interest in
quantum computing when he discovered the first quantum
algorithm with meaningful practical significance.108 Shor’s
algorithm, which still excites the imagination today, would
allow a quantum computer to factor and solve the discrete
algorithm problem in polynomial time.109 Effectively, using
Shor’s algorithm, a quantum computer of sufficient complexity
would have the capability to thwart the current methods of
public-key encryption discussed above in Part I.110
algorithm has, at times, spurred classical innovation because researchers will
attempt to prove that no classical alternative exists that could operate at the
quantum algorithm’s speed, but instead find a more efficient classical
algorithm. See Kevin Hartnett, Major Quantum Computing Advance Made
Obsolete by Teenager, QUANTA MAG. (July 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/8WESVWGC (discussing the discovery of a classical algorithm able to solve the
recommendation problem with similar efficiency as a quantum algorithm that
experts previously understood as an example of quantum advantage); Ariel
Bleicher, Quantum Algorithms Struggle Against Old Foe: Clever Computers,
QUANTA MAG. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/C2DX-TQQE (“Paradoxically,
reports of powerful quantum computations are motivating improvements to
classical ones, making it harder for quantum machines to gain an
advantage.”).
107. See generally Lov K. Grover, Quantum Mechanics Helps in Searching
for a Needle in a Haystack, 79 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 325 (1997) (detailing a
quantum search algorithm that would provide a quadratic improvement over
the most efficient possible classical algorithm); Esma Aїmeur et al., Quantum
Speed-Up for Unsupervised Learning, 90 MACH. LEARNING 261 (2012)
(demonstrating how quantum computing could facilitate faster unsupervised
machine learning).
108. See Davide Castelvecchi, Quantum-Computing Pioneer Warns of
Complacency Over Internet Security, NATURE (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/3RXT-QC5L (“The news spread amazingly fast . . . . All sorts
of people were asking me for my paper before I had even finished writing it, so
I had to send them an incomplete draft.” (quoting Peter Shor)).
109. See generally Peter W. Shor, Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime
Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer, 41 SIAM
REV. 303 (1999).
110. See generally Craig Gidney & Martin Ekerå, How to Factor 2048 Bit
RSA Integers in 8 Hours Using 20 Million Noisy Qubits, ARXIV 1905.09749
(May 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/PEM4-HMCJ (PDF) (last updated Apr. 13,
2021) (combining multiple different optimizations to demonstrate how a
twenty million-qubit quantum computer could decrypt popular forms of
public-key encryption in a matter of hours).
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Of course, the mere existence of Shor’s algorithm means
nothing unless quantum computers with the capacity to run it
become a physical reality. Although physics does not preclude
the possibility of creating such a machine, constructing one has
proven to be a considerable engineering challenge.111 Among
other problems, entangled states are highly susceptible to
outside influences such as temperature changes and vibrations,
so engineers need to find clever solutions to prevent outside
interference and create the stable environments necessary to
house the qubits of a quantum computer.112
Researchers first developed a two-qubit quantum computer
in 1998.113 But this mode of construction could not scale into a
system with significantly more qubits, so researchers have
continued to search for other solutions.114 Today, rivaling

111. See Kevin McCaney, Quantum Computing: ‘Physicist’s Dream’ or
‘Engineer’s Nightmare’?, GOV’T CIO (Mar. 23, 2018, 4:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/LK96-2N63 (“The thing driving the hype is the realization
that quantum computing is actually real . . . . It is no longer a physicist’s
dream—it is an engineer’s nightmare.” (quoting MIT professor Isaac Chuang)).
112. See Dashveenjit Kaur, IBM ‘Super-Fridge’ Aims to Solve Quantum
Computer Cooling Problem, TECH HQ (Dec. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/CMF25H8N (reporting on IBM’s plans to build a giant refrigerator named
“GoldenEye” capable of housing a future large qubit system at a temperature
of –459 degrees Fahrenheit); Atoms Make Better Quantum Computers, IONQ,
https://perma.cc/C97W-BD84 (explaining how IonQ uses “a collection of
laser-based techniques called resolved-sideband cooling to produce qubits so
cold that they are almost perfectly still at an atomic level” and then places the
qubits in an extremely strong vacuum to prevent any possible collisions with
other matter).
113. See John Markoff, Quantum Computing Is Becoming More than Just
a Good Idea, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1998), https://perma.cc/BXD6-ED2D
(reporting on the creation of the first quantum computer and the potential
promise of this technology); Neil Gershenfeld & Isaac L. Chuang, Quantum
Computing with Molecules, SCI. AM., https://perma.cc/UPV2-C52S (explaining
the methods used to construct this primitive quantum computer).
114. See Gershenfeld & Chuang, supra note 113
A basic limitation of the chloroform computer is clearly its small
number of qubits. The number of qubits could be expanded, but n
could be no larger than the number of atoms in the molecule
employed. . . . [T]o create still larger computers, other techniques,
such as optical pumping, would be needed to ‘cool’ the spins.
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governments,115 academic laboratories,116 and major technology
companies117 are still competing to develop effective quantum
computers in a quest to attain quantum supremacy on a host of
practical problems.118 Increasingly, it appears that scientists are
on the brink of a quantum future. In late 2019, Google published
a paper in which it claimed to have achieved quantum
supremacy on a specific random sampling task.119 For the first
115. See Michael Kratsios & Chris Liddell, The Trump Administration Is
Investing $1 Billion in Research Institutes to Advance Industries of the Future,
WHITEHOUSE (Aug. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/U75C-GVP6 (announcing a
$625 million investment in quantum information, to include quantum
computing, at five Department of Energy research centers); Jeffrey Lin & P.W.
Singer, China Is Opening a New Quantum Research Supercenter, POPULAR SCI.
(Oct. 10, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://perma.cc/C8BE-D4NA (discussing China’s $10
billion research center for quantum computing).
116. See, e.g., Miranda Volborth, ‘More Possibilities than There Are
Particles
in
the
Universe’,
DUKESTORIES
(Nov.
12,
2020),
https://perma.cc/6M5Q-MJ9D (advertising the aggregation of multiple experts
to form a super team of quantum researchers working toward building
stronger quantum computers at a Duke lab); About the Institute for Quantum
Computing, UNIV. WATERLOO, https://perma.cc/NJW9-SCH9 (detailing the
success of a research institute in Canada that is completely dedicated to
quantum information research and has produced 1,869 publications since
2002); About HQI, HARV. QUANTUM INITIATIVE, https://perma.cc/56PC-VV5S
(promoting Harvard’s quantum research community).
117. See Jay Gambetta, IBM’s Roadmap for Scaling Quantum Technology,
IBM (Sept. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/3PHB-BBQ3 (revealing IBM’s plans to
build a 1,121 qubit computer by 2023 and a one-million qubit computer in the
next decade); Paul Smith-Goodson, Google’s Top Quantum Scientist Explains
in Detail Why He Resigned, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:31 AM),
https://perma.cc/4AMB-UQ2S (“The Google plan is roughly to build a
million-qubit system in about ten years, with sufficiently low errors to do error
correction. Then at that point you will have enough error-corrected logical
qubits that you can run useful, powerful algorithms that you now can’t solve
on a classical supercomputer.” (quoting former Google lead quantum scientist
John Martinis)).
118. See Bernard Marr, What Is Quantum Supremacy and Quantum
Computing? (And How Excited Should We Be?), FORBES (Aug. 17, 2020 12:19
AM), https://perma.cc/3XJQ-75UP (defining quantum supremacy as the ability
of a quantum computer to perform a task that a classical computer could not,
or that would take a classical computer an incredibly long time to complete).
119. See Frank Arute et al., Quantum Supremacy Using a Programmable
Superconducting Processor, 574 NATURE 505, 505 (2019) (“Our Sycamore
processor takes about 200 seconds to sample one instance of a quantum circuit
a million times—our benchmarks currently indicate that the equivalent task
for a state-of-the-art classical supercomputer would take approximately
10,000 years.”). But see Edwin Pednault et al., On “Quantum Supremacy”, IBM
(Oct. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/9NEW-TFL8 (“[A]n ideal simulation of the
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time, a quantum computer had carried out an operation that
classical computers could not.120 One year later, researchers in
China announced that they had built a quantum computer
capable of Gaussian boson sampling one hundred trillion times
faster than would be possible using a classical system.121
Although nobody can predict exactly when it will happen, the
next large quantum computing milestone could be the
construction of a quantum computer capable of factoring large
numbers.122 Scientists have already built a scalable model
capable of factoring small numbers, so regardless of the
timeline, eventual development appears inevitable.123

same task can be performed on a classical system in 2.5 days and with far
greater fidelity. This is in fact a conservative, worst-case estimate, and we
expect that with additional refinements the classical cost of the simulation can
be further reduced.”).
120. See Jeffrey Kluger, Google Has Achieved ‘Quantum Supremacy.’ Just
What the Heck Is That?, TIME (Oct. 23, 2019, 12:01 PM),
https://perma.cc/KJM6-SQSG (last updated Oct. 24, 2019, 9:24 AM) (“[T]here’s
no denying that a hinge-point in computer history has been turned. . . . [T]he
fact is, the quantum world has always existed. The news—the huge news—is
that now we’ve arrived there, too.”).
121. See Han-Sen Zhong et al., Quantum Computational Advantage Using
Photons, 370 SCIENCE 1460, 1460 (2020) (“The photonic quantum computer,
Jiuzhang, generates up to 76 output photon clicks, which yields an output
state-space dimension of 1030 and a sampling rate that is faster than using the
state-of-the-art simulation strategy and supercomputers by a factor of ~1014.”).
Currently there are no known practical applications of this technique beyond
demonstrating quantum supremacy. Hamish Johnston, Quantum Advantage
Demonstrated Using Gaussian Boson Sampling, PHYSICS WORLD (Dec. 3,
2020), https://perma.cc/U8YA-YDLN (noting the lack of concrete practical
applications to Gaussian boson sampling but remaining optimistic that it
could help future research efforts).
122. See Volborth, supra note 116 (“[T]he Duke team agrees that getting
close enough to grab the golden ring—breaking public-key cryptography—is
still at least a decade away.”); Jon R. Lindsay, Why Is Trump Funding
Quantum Computing Research but Cutting Other Science Budgets?, WASH.
POST (Mar. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/F4UP-7S7M (“It may take decades to
clear all the engineering hurdles.”); Cecelia Smith-Schoenwalder, What to
Know About ‘Quantum Supremacy’, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 22, 2019, 4:17 PM),
https://perma.cc/A7JL-WRA6 (noting that quantum computers capable of
breaking encryption systems are a long way off, while simultaneously quoting
technology analyst Brian Hopkins as saying that “[t]here are a number of
breakthroughs that could take a lot less time than we think . . . . It could
change very quickly”).
123. See Jennifer Chu, The Beginning of the End for Encryption Schemes?,
MIT NEWS (Mar. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/HK6L-WSZ6 (reporting on a
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With such developments lurking on the horizon, lawmakers
need to think critically about whether society is prepared for the
quantum future, and if not, what new laws and adjustments to
existing laws they need to enact. Interplay between the current
encryption exceptions of state data breach notification laws and
quantum decryption deserves some attention on this front. Will
the construction of a computer capable of quantum decryption
require data holders to alert everyone whose personal
information they have ever held of a potential breach? What
does the role of data breach notification laws look like for newly
collected or generated data beyond that threshold? Finally, what
future consequences do current encryption exceptions hold
because of their implicit assumption that common asymmetric
encryption mechanisms promise indefinite security?
IV. SHOR’S ALGORITHM AS A TRIGGER FOR CURRENT DATA
BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS
Once scientists realize a quantum computer capable of
factoring with Shor’s algorithm, not only will public-key
encryption methods fail moving forward, but also any stockpiled
encrypted data will no longer remain protected.124 Because state
data breach notification laws are intended to protect people if
their personal data become insecure, intuitively one might
expect to receive a notification if all of her private information
became accessible at once.125 However, encryption exceptions
muddy this water. If the laws do not require any action by the
data holder with respect to lost encrypted information, perhaps
they convey no duty here. To address that inquiry, this Note will
revisit the various groupings of encryption havens provided in
the different states’ data breach notification laws to discern
quantum computer factoring the number fifteen and its creator’s belief that
the machine will be “straightforwardly scalable”).
124. See Quantum Computing and Cybersecurity, THALES (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://perma.cc/TT7J-PZRX (cautioning that “encrypted data can be saved
and decrypted at a later point in time” with a quantum computer); Arthur
Herman, Booz Allen Sounds the Alarm on China’s Coming Quantum Harvest,
FORBES (Dec. 9, 2021, 11:48 AM), https://perma.cc/9SPV-BT69 (specifically
identifying a concerted Chinese plan of stealing data with the intention to
decrypt that information in the future with technology the country is actively
developing).
125. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
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whether they would mandate notification for all data that could
possibly be compromised by quantum factoring.
A.

The Tennessee Model Revisited

In a hypothetical state using the abandoned Tennessee
encryption treatment, data holders would constantly issue
breach notifications regardless of whether taken information
had been encrypted.126 Theoretically, people would already have
been warned that their encrypted personal information was
insecure prior to the emergence of quantum decryption.127 Data
holders could reasonably argue that they had already met their
statutory duty and hold no responsibility to issue further
warning.128 Unfortunately, the original alerts would likely have
fallen on deaf ears. Because this framework vastly overstates
the current dangers of identity theft, citizens might have become
numb to the repeated alerts.129 Further, at the time people
received the original notice, they would have no reason to take
it seriously given common trust in the power of standard
encryption.130 Quantum decryption would create a drastic swing
in the relative accessibility of personal information for which the
Tennessee model would already have provided a premature
notification. By issuing data breach notifications too soon, this
statute would convey danger as ineffectively as if no notification
had been provided at all.
B.

The West Virginia Model Revisited

Jurisdictions following the West Virginia model would also
likely fail to address the danger of quantum factoring to
consumers through their data breach notification laws. A
law-abiding data trustee would have no reason to report, or even
keep track of, instances in which potentially malicious parties
accessed encrypted personal information under a statutory
126. See Rosemarie Lally, Tennessee Strengthens Data Security Breach
Notification Law, SHRM (May 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/M3MB-6GU2 (noting
that the old Tennessee data breach notification law would require immediate
notification of a breach even if it only contained encrypted data).
127. Id.
128. See supra note 78.
129. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 31–38 and accompanying text.
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regime that excludes encrypted information from the definition
of a breach.131 The texts of these statutes simply do not contain
a temporal element to mandate notification when unusable data
previously compromised is presently rendered useful by an
outside force (in this case, by quantum computing making
asymmetric encryption insecure).132 In fact, most of these
statutes call for sending notifications as quickly as possible
following the discovery of a breach.133 Delayed notices for known
breaches that originally seemed harmless would conflict with
those provisions.
Recall that if an encryption key was stolen in one of the
West Virginia model jurisdictions, subjects of previously
compromised personally identifying data would likely be
notified because loss of the key would constitute a fresh
breach.134 The same rationale does not apply as easily to the use
of quantum processes for decryption. In the original scenario, a
“breach” would presumably have occurred because the fraudster
stole essentially unencrypted data to the extent that the key
made it easily readable.135 Those whose encrypted data had
previously been compromised would get pulled into the requisite
notification as a precautionary consequence.136 A fraudster
using Shor’s algorithm has everything she needs as soon as she
accessed the encrypted information.137 She never needs to steal
“unencrypted” data from the data holder, so there is never a
breach to trigger notification.138 As such, the West Virginia
model would not require data holders to notify people that their

131. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 46A-2A-101(1) (2022) (defining a data breach
to include only compromised unencrypted data).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72(4) (2020) (specifying that
notification should be made without “unreasonable delay,” seemingly tied to
initial discovery of a breach).
134. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
135. See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 19, at 426 (illustrating how keys
facilitate easy encryption and decryption of data).
136. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
137. See Quantum Computing and Cybersecurity, supra note 124
https://perma.cc/TT7J-PZRX (“[E]ncryption must be secured against Quantum
Computers even before these exist, as encrypted data can be saved and
decrypted at a later point in time.”).
138. Id.
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encrypted data had been previously taken once quantum
technology makes that data readable.
In fact, as legislators have currently worded the West
Virginia model encryption havens, theft of encrypted data might
not even trigger notification for future breaches that occur after
quantum computers capable of breaking standard public-key
encryption have emerged. That would depend heavily on
whether the definitional understanding of the word “encryption”
evolves. For example, “encrypt” can mean “encode.”139 That
definition would not require notification because stolen
encrypted data would still be encoded; a hacker would simply
have the requisite mathematical tools to discern the confidential
key used for encoding. Alternatively, its meaning could be tied
to federally established encryption standards.140 If such
standards are adjusted to address the threat of quantum
decryption, then it is conceivable that the asymmetric
mathematical operations we currently consider “encryption”
could fall out of the term’s definition. Most data breach
notification statutes do not provide precise mathematical
definitions of what “encryption” means.141 Those jurisdictions
that have stated what encryption means in more concrete terms
currently have the benchmark fixed in a place that would
present no obstacle to quantum decryption.142 Some states
might have circumvented this problem by specifying
unreadability as an additional condition for the encryption
exception to kick in, but even this might not provide assurance

139. Encrypt, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/M7DCQFZM.
140. See Ross Thomas, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES): What It Is
and How It Works, HASHEDOUT (Apr. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/SDP2-ZAWM
(explaining the use of AES, the NIST established encryption standard).
141. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 46A-2A-101 (2022) (defining encryption as
“transformation of data through the use of an algorithmic process to into a
form in which there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of a
confidential process or key”). The West Virginia definition is unhelpful because
encryption would still yield low probability of assigning meaning without the
confidential key, but Shor’s algorithm would make it impossible to fully protect
the confidential keys from parties with advanced technological capabilities.
142. See, e.g., 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.3-3 (2022) (“‘Encrypted’ means the
transformation of data through the use of a one hundred twenty-eight (128)
bit or higher algorithmic process into a form in which there is a low probability
of assigning meaning without use of a confidential process or key.”).
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of post-quantum notifications.143 In most cases, it appears that
for the statutes of West Virginia model jurisdictions to require
notification when what we currently understand as encrypted
data has been compromised in a post-quantum world, their
definitions of what constitutes “encryption” need to be revised.
C.

The South Dakota Model Revisited

Current South Dakota model laws would similarly fail to
mandate notifications around quantum-decryption breaches.
Like under the West Virginia model, these statutes have no
concrete temporal element that would require data trustees to
tell people that their encrypted personally-identifying
information was compromised in a distant breach once quantum
decryption renders that data insecure.144 Further, use of a
quantum computer capable of decrypting encrypted information
still appears to skirt around the South Dakota notification
requirements because encrypted data would fall under the
encryption havens.145
In fact, the expanded definition of a breach under these
statutes could make it more likely that quantum decryption
would not require notification moving forward.146 By explicitly
enumerating an exception to the encryption haven notification
shield, these laws preclude the judiciary from inferring
additional exceptions.147 By clarifying that compromise of a key

143. See WIS. STAT. § 134.98 (2022) (specifying that loss of personal
information requisite for a breach must contain an element that is “not
publicly available information and is not encrypted, redacted, or altered in a
manner that renders the element unreadable”). Of course, pressing this as a
reason for post-quantum notifications could spur debate about what
readability means. When untouched, encrypted information would remain
largely meaningless, but more people would have the technological capabilities
to revert the data back into its coherent form.
144. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-40-19 (2020) (making no mention of the
data holder’s responsibilities to keep track of potentially leaked encrypted data
in case a key later becomes compromised); see also supra notes 134–138 and
accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 139–142 and accompanying text.
146. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-40-19 (2022) (including encrypted
information taken with an encryption key in the definition of a security
breach).
147. See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980)
(“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general
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with encrypted data constitutes a breach, these jurisdictions
have implicitly endorsed the position that encryption status
depends not on data readability, but rather on whether
mathematical operations have scrambled the information. That
level of legislative specificity ultimately impairs the efficacy of
these laws in a post-quantum world by preventing an evolving
interpretation of “encryption” that would require notification
whenever personally identifiable information has been breached
in a readily accessible format.
D.

The California Model Revisited

The California model addresses some of these problems, but
still would not necessitate widespread notification as a result of
quantum decryption. By excluding language about encryption
from the definition of a data breach, but instead adding it to
notification requirements, these statutes are more likely to
allow delayed notification when formerly taken encrypted data
becomes compromised by the development of quantum
factoring.148 This follows the same rationale that would require
notification in California should someone steal an encryption
key corresponding to encrypted data that had been compromised
years earlier.149 Of course, the issue of how to interpret
“encryption” would persist.150 Presumably these jurisdictions
would not require notification because they tend to specify
cut-outs for stolen encrypted data combined with access to the
corresponding keys.151 Again, current data breach notification
laws appear likely to fail at protecting consumers once effective
quantum decryption becomes possible.

prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of
evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”).
148. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2022) (requiring notification of a
breach to residents whose unencrypted personal information was taken during
the breach).
149. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 139–143, 146–147 and accompanying text.
151. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2022) (requiring notification of a
breach to a person “whose encrypted personal information was . . . acquired by
an unauthorized person and the encryption key or security credential
was . . . acquired”).
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E.

The Wyoming Model Revisited

Curiously, Wyoming’s data breach notification law might
have the greatest potential to force meaningful notifications
about compromised personal information once quantum
decryption becomes possible. Excluding all mentions of
encryption removes the notification exception that could plague
other jurisdictions’ untouched data breach laws once quantum
computers can decrypt.152 Once a breach has been discovered, “a
reasonable and prompt investigation to determine the likelihood
that personal identifying information has been or will be
misused” could certainly point toward notification if a company
determined that the hacker of encrypted data also had the
technological capabilities to decrypt with quantum
computing.153 When data holders become aware of the danger
posed by quantum decryption, they will need to acknowledge a
real risk of misuse should malicious parties access any
encrypted data moving forward.
The Wyoming statute still would not necessarily mandate
retroactive reporting for encrypted data taken before quantum
decryption because investigations start as soon as the data
trustee “becomes aware of a breach of the security of the
system.”154 Presumably, most prior investigations would have
quickly closed given encryption’s strong current security, and
the law does not require reexamination. Still, unlike most
jurisdictions, the Wyoming data breach notification law would
almost certainly require notifications following the development
of quantum decryption. This differs from the abandoned
Tennessee model, because the relevant change in quantum
capabilities would create an increase in notifications, making
the heightened danger of data theft more noticeable to
consumers.
While the many different data breach notification laws have
their unique nuances, it appears that they will collectively fail
to require meaningful notifications about theft of encrypted
personal information once quantum computers have decryption
152. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-501 (2022) (defining a security breach as
“unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that materially compromises
the security, confidentiality or integrity of personal identifying information”).
153. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-502 (2022).
154. Id.
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capacities. Certainly, these statutes set only a lower bound for
data holder responsibility, and the data trustees might
independently rise to the occasion and choose to issue
nonmandatory notices.155 But betting on companies to act in a
manner that might be against their best interest could certainly
backfire.156 Changes to the national data breach notification law
landscape must be considered and enacted in anticipation of
quantum decryption to minimize its potential harm.
V. A PROPOSED FEDERAL DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION
FRAMEWORK BETTER SITUATED TO HANDLE QUANTUM
ENCRYPTION
Because the emergence of quantum encryption would pose
a security threat to the personal information of all American
citizens, a federal data breach notification statute might provide
the most efficient and effective means to address holes in the
current state-law patchwork. Roughly fifteen years passed
between California adopting the first data breach notification
law and Alabama, the last holdout, passing its own.157 Such a
prolonged timeline on these laws’ inductions indicates that
individual adjustments to every jurisdiction’s statute would
move far too slowly to adequately address the problem. Of
155. A commitment to notify people about the security of company-owned
data could be construed as falling under the broad umbrella of corporate social
responsibility (CSR). See Brian Edmondson, What Is Corporate Social
Responsibility?, BALANCE, https://perma.cc/89V3-22EL (last updated Oct. 20,
2021) (“Corporate social responsibility can refer to any effort to improve a
company’s eco-friendliness and increase its social impact.”). Evidence supports
the notion that engaging in CSR can benefit companies, so generous reporting
might be a wise business decision. STEVE ROCHLIN ET AL., PROJECT ROI 17–20
(2015), https://perma.cc/JQ7X-SFZ2 (documenting various benefits of CSR
including customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and higher sales
volumes).
156. See, e.g., IBM Study Shows Data Breach Costs on the Rise, supra note
45 (finding that companies face steep financial consequences when they report
a data breach).
157. See Elizabeth Larson, New Legislation to Strengthen Data Breach
Notification Law, LAKE CNTY. NEWS (Feb. 25, 2019, 12:42 AM),
https://perma.cc/J973-38C6 (highlighting that California passed the first data
breach notification law in 2003); Data Breach Notification Effective June 1 in
Alabama, ALA. RETAIL (Mar. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/2B8N-FYRL
(proclaiming passage of Alabama’s data breach notification law in 2018, and
recognizing it as the fiftieth state to codify one).
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course, every jurisdiction should still attempt to fix any
weaknesses within its own laws, but a blanket nationwide data
breach notification that answers to concerns about
under-notification due to quantum decryption would provide
much needed protection to constituents of jurisdictions that
drag their feet in implementing desirable updates.
Although no federal data breach notification law currently
exists, federal legislators have periodically expressed interest in
passing one.158 Historically, debate over whether a federal law
would preempt state data breach notification laws has created a
point of contention and prevented necessary congressional
consensus.159 Some have argued that preemption is necessary
because implementing a single data breach notification statute
would create simplicity and help data holders with limited
financial capacity comply with numerous confusing legal
reporting requirements.160 Others worry that a federal body
would not willingly adopt stronger data breach notification
protections than already-existing local equivalents.161 For some
158. See S. REP. NO. 111-290, at 1 (2010) (providing the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary’s recommendation to pass Senate Bill 139 which would have
codified a federal data breach notification law); Data Security and Breach
Notification Act, S. 2179, 115th Cong. (2017) (“A [b]ill [t]o protect consumers
by requiring reasonable security policies and procedures to protect data
containing personal information, and to provide for nationwide notice in the
event of a breach of security.”).
159. See Grant Gross, Lawmakers Push for Federal Data Breach
Notification
Law,
PC WORLD
(July
18,
2013,
12:42
PM),
https://perma.cc/9RLR-MJ4N (“The debate over whether a national law should
preempt state laws . . . has held up a national breach notification bill in
Congress for years . . . .”).
160. See Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, Jr., Preemption: A Balanced
National Approach to Protecting All Americans’ Privacy, BROOKINGS (June 29,
2020), https://perma.cc/DP2T-VR5D (acknowledging that selective or
incomplete preemption would undermine “the goal of a national standard for
privacy practices, compliance systems and consumer expectations”).
161. See Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to Congress (July 7,
2015), https://perma.cc/MXT4-PXVQ (asserting the concern of forty-seven
state attorneys general that “[p]reempting state law would make consumers
less protected than they are right now” and that “[i]f states are limited by
federal legislation, [they] will be unable to respond to [consumer] concerns”);
Reporting Data Breaches: Is Federal Legislation Needed to Protect Consumers?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Com., 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of Janice D. Schakowsky, Ill.
Rep.), https://perma.cc/AH54-JTBR (“[M]y view is that any federal law should
not weaken strong State laws. In addition, any federal response should
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citizens, preemption by a weaker federal statute would mark an
undesirable step in the wrong direction.162 Indeed, the idea that
federal preemption can permit actors to engage in bad behavior
that local jurisdictions have already curtailed is not new in the
sphere of cyber regulation.163
Because this Note primarily focuses on the issue of whether
data breach notification laws adequately protect against the
impending threat of quantum decryption, concerns about the
current costs of differing state laws take a backseat. With over
fifty different data breach notification laws already in effect,
adding one more in the form of a non-preemptive federal statute
would not create complexity issues so much as it would fail to
address them. In an ideal world, a federal data breach
notification law would provide far stronger protections than any
state equivalent. In that scenario, preemption would have no
drawbacks and emerge as the obvious choice. Recognizing the
improbability of such action, a federal data breach notification
law that supersedes its state counterparts only if the local
statute affords less protection would provide the greatest
opportunity to address the quantum decryption problem.
Beyond the advantage of universal coverage, a federal data
breach notification law would provide greater protection against
quantum decryption because a singular federal decisionmaker
empowered to make determinations about the dangers
presented by quantum computing would likely have the best
access to guiding information. Specifically, state officials or
individual data holders will not be able to as effectively evaluate
when public-key encryption will no longer provide adequate
protection, triggering alerts under hypothetically updated data
breach notification laws. As a threshold matter, laypeople might
have difficulty identifying if a quantum computer capable of
compromising encryption has been made, particularly because

establish a baseline so that every American can be assured some level of data
protection, not just notification after the fact.”); id. at 6 (statement of Henry
A. Waxman, Cal. Rep.) (“[F]ederal legislation must not move backward by
undermining those States with strong breach notification laws.”).
162. Id.
163. See generally OpenRisk, LLC v. MicroStrategy Servs. Corp., 876 F.3d
518 (4th Cir. 2017) (determining that the federal Copyright Act preempts state
conversion and computer fraud claims under the Virginia Computer Crimes
Act).
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other competitors in the quantum race will want to cast doubt
on potential successes of their rivals.164 A central authority
might have stronger expertise to sift through conflicting
accounts. Such an actor would also be better situated to access
information about quantum developments that are not made
available to the American public. Intelligence on the
developments of hostile foreign powers, or even within domestic
government labs might not be widely circulated.165
Once a quantum computer capable of factoring is recognized
to have been built, decisionmakers would still need to determine
at what point it actually threatens personal information and
merits notification required by law. Developers of a quantum
computer will surely be familiar with the classic science fiction
trope examining the moral concerns and horrible outcomes of
humans developing technology that society is not prepared
for.166 To that end, the developers of a factoring quantum
computer might not willingly choose to share their machine
after contemplating its ethical implications.167 Are data breach
notifications necessary for a technological advancement
contained to a single lab? Perhaps not.

164. See Marr, supra note 118 (documenting an instance in which Google
claimed to have made a significant advance with its quantum computing
program and IBM immediately pushed back by casting doubt on the validity
of Google’s assertion).
165. The United States and China have invested heavily in quantum
development. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Indeed, quantum
development has been likened to a modern space race. See Walter G. Johnson,
Comment, Governance Tools for the Second Quantum Revolution, 59
JURIMETRICS J. 487, 489–92 (2019) (discussing the race for quantum
developments and the corresponding concern about potential harm it could
present to national security). Suffice it to say, government actors will pay close
attention as this unfolds. Id. at 497–98 (noting NSA interest in quantum
decryption, and leak of that information by Edward Snowden).
166. See, e.g., EX MACHINA (Universal Pictures 2014) (examining how
advanced AI could challenge the notion of what it means to be human and
demonstrating what could go wrong if human-like AI is developed before that
question is answered); MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002) (imagining
a world in which advanced technology results in false criminal convictions for
innocent people).
167. See David B. Resnik & Kevin C. Elliott, The Ethical Challenges of
Socially Responsible Science, 23 ACCOUNTABILITY RSCH. 31, 38–39 (2016)
(advocating for socially responsible dissemination of scientific discovery and
providing examples of how virology research is vetted over concerns that it
might be used for terrorism before release).
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But that begs the follow-up question, what is the threshold
at which quantum computing has spread enough to demand
these notifications? The answer to that concern is murky now,
and unlikely to become clear even as technology develops. If
widespread access and use of quantum computers maps onto the
proliferation of classical computers, decades might pass between
the creation of a factoring quantum machine and its presence in
most households.168 However, classical computers grew more
powerful at an exponential clip for decades.169 Viewed as the
natural extension of classical computing, one might expect
rollout of quantum computers to occur at a prodigious rate.170
Quantum decryption could also become widely available on a
much shorter timeline than it took for public access to classical
computers because of cloud computing—the act of outsourcing
storage of data or expensive computations to powerful machines
via the internet.171 Some pioneers in the industry have already
developed a business model around allowing interested
businesses to purchase cloud access to their quantum
computers.172 Theoretically, a malicious party could rent
quantum computing capacity to decrypt stockpiled data.
Regardless of the actual threat timeline, if individual data
holders or states must independently assess when quantum
decryption has developed or access to it has spread enough to
168. See Timothy Williamson, History of Computers: A Brief Timeline, LIVE
SCI. (Dec. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/JGS6-93WW (demonstrating the
prolonged timeline over which people conceived the idea of a computer, first
models were built, and computers became commonplace).
169. See Carla Tardi, Moore’s Law, INVESTOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/U5M7BCT8 (last updated Feb. 23, 2021) (defining Moore’s Law as the “perception
that the number of transistors on a microchip doubles every two years,” and
noting that it has roughly held true since Moore first contemplated it in 1965).
170. See id. (acknowledging that physical impediments to continued
advancements of processing power might be quickly approaching and
suggesting quantum physics as a potential path forward).
171. See Eric Griffith, What Is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG.,
https://perma.cc/4K4H-ZP93 (last updated June 29, 2020) (providing a basic
overview of how cloud computing works and various ways in which it is
currently used).
172. See Stephen Shankland, Microsoft Opens Its Azure Quantum
Computer Cloud Service to the Public, CNET (Feb. 1, 2021, 12:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/K87F-EQRV (last updated Feb. 3, 2021, 9:59 AM) (reporting
on Microsoft’s public commercialization of a quantum-computing cloud with
Azure Cloud, and how it has joined Amazon, Google, and IBM, which also all
provide quantum services over the cloud).
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require notification under varying data breach notification laws,
they will inevitably reach different conclusions. Empowering an
actor at the federal level to unilaterally decide when quantum
decryption has become an issue would provide the benefit of a
uniform interpretation made by an actor with access to the
expertise and information needed to adequately evaluate the
problem. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) currently “develops and disseminates the standards that
allow technology to work seamlessly and business to operate
smoothly,” making it a prime candidate to assume these
duties.173
To sufficiently address quantum decryption, a federal data
breach notification law would need to provide notifications for
personal data that had not been compromised prior to quantum
advancement but will become readable afterwards. That would
require data holders to be prepared to tell people what personal
information quantum decryption could potentially compromise.
To address that issue, this Note proposes that the statute define
a breach of personal information without mention of encryption
or any other exclusion, like in the California model.174 It should
also require data owners to hold some record of what personal
information they have held about a person for a fixed number of
years. Finally, the statute should contain provisions that
require notification, both forward- and backward- facing, at
tiered thresholds based on readability in alignment with
concrete technological milestones.
Keeping the definition of what constitutes a breach
separate from any reporting exclusion helps ensure that a
possibility for future notifications is not foreclosed by a present
exclusion that could become obsolete. As discussed previously,
many current state data breach notification laws define a breach
such that none has occurred if only encrypted data was stolen.175
This method fails to register the possibility of future
technological developments rendering that encrypted data
readable.176 In such instances, issuing a notification would be
desirable, but it is impossible to point to any “breach” that could

173.
174.
175.
176.

Standards: Overview, NIST, https://perma.cc/JVR4-W5CX.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134–138, 145–148 and accompanying text.
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form the basis of the alert.177 A federal data breach notification
statute aiming to curb the harm of quantum decryption should
separate any reporting exception from the definition of a breach
to avoid this problem.
Next, the statute must require data owners to keep record
of the data they have held for a set period of time. Having
accepted the premise that breaches today could yield
compromises of personal information in the future as technology
develops, data trustees must know what information could have
been taken if they are to be expected to provide people with
meaningful notification down the road. Of course, preventing
data trustees from destroying unneeded data would perpetuate
the possibility of the data itself being stolen.178 Thus, the statute
should emphasize preserving records of the type of data held as
opposed to the actual information itself. For example, keeping
note of the fact that a company once held Jane Doe’s social
security number is easier and less dangerous than preserving
the nine-digit number itself. In this way, a federal data breach
notification statute could ensure that data trustees retain
sufficient records to alert people if future developments render
their personal data compromised, while limiting relative risk
and costs.
In fact, Congress could determine that some data records
might not need to be preserved indefinitely. Most banks require
credit-card replacements every few years.179 Consequently,
there would be no reason to require data holders to keep record
of a credit-card number indefinitely. Forced information
obsolescence, as exemplified by credit-card numbers, might
lessen the eventual impact of quantum factoring by making old,
encrypted data mines useless, although readable. An ideal
federal data breach notification statute could encourage a
higher velocity of data obsolescence by loosening reporting and

177. See supra notes 134–138, 145–148 and accompanying text.
178. See George Platsis, Data Destruction: Importance and Best Practices,
SEC. INTEL. (Nov. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/RHL8-3BRG (observing that a
data holder might desire to get rid of data for various reasons and outlining
multiple ways to destroy the data so that it is never in danger of becoming
recovered and compromised).
179. See What to Expect When Your Capital One Credit Card Expires, CAP.
ONE (Mar. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/K4XF-9XZ5 (“Credit cards generally
need to be replaced every three to five years, depending on the issuer.”).
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record-keeping requirements when updates have made older
information useless.
Picture this in the context of passwords: most organizations
encourage password changes every few months to reduce the
useful life of a hacked password.180 Acquiring an old password
might not grant immediate access to a system, but given many
people’s bad habit of making slight changes to existing
passwords in updates, it could provide valuable information in
guessing current passwords.181 However, if the velocity of
password changes increases, perhaps requiring updates on a
weekly or even daily basis, then any given individual old
password becomes less useful, both because of its shorter
lifespan and because, as iterations of a password expand, it
becomes more difficult to keep varying the password in
predictable ways. Many pieces of information are static, like
social security numbers.182 But to the extent possible, constantly
refreshing information might lessen the potential fallout from
quantum decryption. Indeed, the greatest defense against
problematic future decryption of current data is a simple
reduction in the sheer volume of data presently collected.183
Data that does not exist cannot be abused. Even if a federal data
breach notification law could not completely force an increase in
the velocity of information obsolescence, encouraging one by
limiting records retained by data holders to possession of useful
information could provide a helpful incentive.

180. See Dave Johnson, How Often You Should Change Your Passwords,
According to Cybersecurity Experts, BUS. INSIDER (June 26, 2020, 10:07 AM),
https://perma.cc/H6GV-J6TD (stating that “conventional wisdom holds that
you should change your passwords every few months” to minimize the window
in which a cybercriminal could use a compromised password).
181. See Lorrie Cranor, Time to Rethink Mandatory Password Changes,
FTC (Mar. 2, 2016, 10:55 AM), https://perma.cc/GB8F-TLTT (“[U]sers who are
required to change their passwords frequently select weaker passwords to
begin with, and then change them in predictable ways that attackers can guess
easily.”).
182. See Can I Change My Social Security Number, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/UF3P-JFS6 (last updated Nov. 30, 2019) (detailing very
limited circumstances under which a social security number can be changed).
183. See FTC, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED
WORLD iv (2015), https://perma.cc/BL3U-MEPU (urging data minimization
because it decreases potential harm in the event of a data breach and
decreases risk of data use in defiance of reasonable consumer expectations).
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The data breach notification statute should next empower
an expert entity to universally determine when quantum
decryption has conquered public-key encryption. At that point,
data-holders will need to issue backward-looking breach
notifications based on their records. Rather than having data
trustees contact individuals, the statute might function better
by having the data owners send their records to a government
entity that then compiles and distributes the information.184 A
single notification with every potential compromise of personal
information could reinforce the sobering gravity of this
development. It would also save consumers from a barrage of
separate notifications that could be ignored as spam.
Once the statute has established what reporting
responsibilities exist when quantum computing technologies
debut, it will need to specify protocols for notification in the
subsequent period of uncertainty. Quantum encryption
protocols have been discovered, but they require all involved
parties to use their own quantum machine.185 Essentially, online
communication will not be fully secure until classical computers
have phased out and quantum computers become ubiquitous. If
the data breach notification law requires notification in the
interim for every breach of insecure personal data, then it will
effectively collapse into the abandoned Tennessee statute.186 If

184. Regulations stemming from Singapore’s data breach notification
statute have implemented a system in which all breaches must be reported to
a centralized authority regardless of whether notifications will be sent to
affected individuals. Personal Data Protection (Notification of Data Breaches)
Regulations 2021 (GN No. S 64/2021) (Sing.). This model might be used as a
framework for consolidating information in preparation of the necessary
backward reporting.
185. See RIEFFEL & POLAK, supra note 32, at 320–21 (explaining that some
quantum cryptographic protocols have been developed that are
unconditionally secure against attack through their reliance on fundamental
properties of quantum mechanics); Charles H. Bennett & Gilles Brassard,
Quantum Cryptography: Public Key Distribution and Coin Tossing, 560
THEORETICAL COMPUT. SCI. 7, 9–10 (2014) (outlining the first quantum key
distribution scheme, now known as BB84 after its authors and the year they
originally published the paper). While the cloud might allow earlier access to
quantum factoring, access to quantum computing through the cloud will not
solve the issue of insecure communications. A classical computer would have
no reliably secure way of sending confidential information to the cloud.
186. See supra Part II.D.
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not, then there will be no reporting at all with universally
insecure digital communication. Both scenarios are undesirable.
Of course, by that point reporting data breaches will be a
relatively small issue compared to the damage caused by the
widespread data theft necessitating these reports. Concerns
about identity theft that spurred the initial adoption of state
data breach notification laws will resurface, now both
More
troubling,
no
unchecked
and
uncheckable.187
authenticated or secured transactions of any kind will be
transmittable online. Compounding the problem, stockpiled
data from years of encrypted data raids will suddenly become
readable and conceivably fed into neural networks.188 By
limiting any ability for people to safely communicate remotely,
quantum factoring could put an incredible strain on our society
given its current reliance on the security of online transactions
and interactions. This will affect everyone from the online
shopper to the five-star general tasked with relaying a
high-level military secret. A data breach notification law will not
alleviate these issues, especially if it cannot encourage a safer
alternative mode of communication once incessant notifications
have conveyed the fact that digital interactions are insecure.
Perhaps the only way that a quantum decryption crisis
might be avoided is if a protocol similar to traditional public-key
encryption is discovered that is secure from both traditional and
quantum attacks. If such an innovation is made, it would be
imperative that society widely adopt this type of encryption to
hold out any hope of weathering the chaos of a
quantum-computing storm. For the past few years, NIST has
been holding a competition for potential alternatives to current
public-key encryption standards and to prepare for a quantum
world.189 Many remaining “post-quantum” contenders rely on a
187. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
188. See Quantum Computing and Cybersecurity, supra note 124
https://perma.cc/TT7J-PZRX (“[E]ncryption must be secured against Quantum
Computers even before these exist, as encrypted data can be saved and
decrypted at a later point in time.”); Ben Dickson, The Security Threats of
Neural Networks and Deep Learning Algorithms, TECHTALKS (Dec. 27, 2018),
https://perma.cc/C9E9-QUJ8 (explaining the dangers of neural networks and
deep learning).
189. See Post Quantum Cryptography Project Overview, NIST (Jan. 3,
2017), https://perma.cc/AW9T-DLN8 (last updated Dec. 2, 2021) (providing
background on the competition).

DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS

517

lattice-based approach to cryptography.190 While no method for
cracking lattice-based encryption with quantum computers has
been discovered, it also has not been mathematically proven
that this form of encryption is impervious to quantum
computers.191
Considering these efforts, a federal data breach notification
law could contain an explicit exception to notifications, both
forward- and backward- looking, for data protected by an
approved post-quantum encryption method. On one hand, this
could encourage adoption of much-needed new encryption
standards blunting the impact of quantum decryption. On the
other hand, as this Note has demonstrated, creating a
contingency in law based on the assumption that difficult math
problems will remain insoluble generates an avenue for that
legal framework to crumble as technology advances, nullifying
the difficulty evaluation. Data breach notification laws must not
allow data holders to hide in the shadows of protective measures
that are or will soon be penetrable. Instead of incorporating
another concrete exception, a new federal data breach
notification statute needs to tie notifications to readability and
delegate the decision of what that looks like to experts capable
of prescribing a fluctuating standard. That determination
should require notifications mindful of past encrypted data that
has become insecure and should look to the future in setting
current readability standards.
In summary, the impending realization of quantum
decryption threatens to radically disrupt efficacy of the current
state-level data breach notification patchwork. To soften the
impact of this development, data breach notification laws should
separate any reference of encryption from the definition of a
breach to require alerts corresponding to past breaches made
presently harmful by shifts in relative encryption security.
Reporting must be tied to a shifting standard of readability as

190. See Jeremy Kahn, Quantum Computers Threaten to End Digital
Security. Here’s What’s Being Done About It, FORTUNE (Sept. 11, 2020, 8:00
AM), https://perma.cc/6B2J-2U7E (discussing finalists for post-quantum
encryption in the NIST competition).
191. See id. (“‘We say that quantum algorithms cannot break them yet,’
Delaram Kahrobaei, a professor of cybersecurity at the University of York, in
England, says. ‘But tomorrow someone comes up with another quantum
algorithm that might break them.’”).
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determined by an independent expert authority. Statutes
should require that data holders keep accurate records of data
that they have held so that they can issue comprehensive
notifications regarding past breaches. The federal government
is best situated to implement these changes by issuing its own
data breach notification law, both because of its broad
jurisdiction and because of its better access to relevant
information on the state of technological advancements.
CONCLUSION
Our society relies on encryption to protect our daily digital
activities.192 When data holders fail in their duties to protect
people’s personal information, data breach notification laws
require them to notify affected parties so that they might take
damage-mitigating action.193 Because legislators codified
explicit exceptions to notification for encrypted data breaches,
data breach notification laws put unwarranted faith in the
continued difficulty of public-key encryption’s underlying
mechanisms.194 Mathematicians have already developed
quantum algorithms capable of rendering current encryption
methods useless.195 Engineers have made considerable strides
towards creating a machine able to facilitate these operations.196
Once a strong enough quantum computer has been realized,
modern encryption will fail, effectively bringing current data
breach notification laws down with it.197
Quantum decryption will have ripple effects in many facets
of daily life and the law. Preemptively changing the data breach
notification framework could provide one small contribution to
dampen this huge impact. Specifically, opening greater avenues
for retroactive reporting will help the public better appreciate
the magnitude of danger from quantum decryption. People could
adjust their behavior by taking greater precautions with their
personal data. Reporting requirements that emphasize a
moving threshold of readability could help encourage more rapid
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 111–123 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.
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adoption of post-quantum encryption as it becomes viable.198
Data breach notification statutes alone cannot fully protect
against a quantum future. But policymakers must prepare now
to soften the inevitable blow to society that quantum computers
will cause. An updated data breach notification framework
provides one tool toward accomplishing that end.

198.

See supra Part V.

